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ABSTRACT
The Contractor Risk Assessment Guide Program (CRAG) was developed in 1988 in response
to a primary recommendation of the President's Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Management that the
Government promote contractor self-governance as a means to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of Government oversight.
This thesis reviews the background leading to the development of the CRAG program and
reviews the ind[• ;dual Chapters of the CRAG program.
The objectives of the thesis are to assess the achievement of the goals of the CRAG program
since its implementation, identify any deficiencies in the CRAG as it exists, make recommendations
for modification of the program and provide a medium for Government and defense industry
personnel to express their opinions on the relative success of the CRAG.
The research resulted in the conclusion that the CRAG has met its goals of improving
contractor internal control systems and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Government
oversight efforts. The research also resulted in recommendations by the researcher of methods to
enhance promotion of the CRAG and its benefits to the defense industry.
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On July 15, 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12526 which established The Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management. The Commission, known as the Packard Commission,
was formed with a broad charter to study Defense Management
practices in general and to specifically review the
procurement processes and make recommendations for
improvement. [Ref. l:p. 1621 One of its conclusions was that
"significant improvements in corporate self-governance can
redress shortcomings in the procurement system and create a
more productive working relationship between Government and
industry." [Ref. 2:p. 51
As a direct result of this finding, the Contractor Risk
Assessment Guide (CRAG)' program was established in October
1988 and implemented in November of the same year. The CRAG
program was developed by representatives from all facets of
the Defense Industry, including the Department of Defense
Inspector General (DODIG), Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA), Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition community and
the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations
1A list of abbreviations can be found in Appendix A.
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(CODSIA), who represented the contractors. (Refs. 3:p. i and
4:p. 15].
The intent of the CRAG is to improve DOD oversight
practices and to improve or facilitate the implementation of
contractors' internal control systems. The program is
voluntary on the part of the DOD contractors and is designed
for the Government to assess each contractor's internal
control systems to better determine the appropriate amount of
oversight required to ensure that the public interest is being
protected. With the ultimate goal of maximizing effectiveness
and efficiency in Government oversight, participation in the
CRAG allows the Government to concentrate its efforts on known
problem areas rather than expend time and effort on areas
deemed adequately monitored and controlled by the contractor.
Participation in the program does not exempt the contractor
from receiving oversight, but it leads to a potential for
reduction in the extent of oversight required for specific
program areas.
The areas of the procurement process that have been
identified as high-risk in the CRAG and that are available for
consideration of reduced oversight include:
"* Indirect Cost Submissions (IDC)
"* Labor Charging (LC)
"* Material Management and Accounting Systems (MMAS)
"* Estimating Systems (ES)
"* Purchasing (PUR)
2
Each area has its own control objective that must be achieved.
Supporting each control objective are a number of major
controls that must ze established in support of CRAG
participation. The contractor has the option of determining
the extent of participation in these areas. However, the
final deermination of contractor qualification rests with the
Government.
The number and magnitude of Government contracts held by
individual contractors (coupled with the respective oversight
efforts) and the quality of their existing internal control
systems are determinants in the decision of whether or not to
participate in the program. Because there is no guarantee
that oversight will be reduced by their participation in the
program, many corporations expressed a hesitancy to apply for
CRAG participation.
The following issues have been identified as other
barriers leading to a reluctance by defense contractors to
participate in the CRAG:
* Lack of awareness of some DOD contractor personnel that
the CRAG program exists.
* Lack of confidence on the part of both industry and
Government personnel that identified deficiencies will be
corrected.
* Lack of confidence on the part of industry that
oversight is actually reduced.
* Contractors' perception that implementation of internal
controls is not worth the effort because of the risk of
not having their processes approved. The benefits may not
outweigh the costs.
3
"* Lack of cooperation and trust between Government agencies
and contractors.
"* Lack of coordination between the various Government
agencies with oversight and audit responsibilities.
[Ref. 5:p. 2]
In its report to the Packard Commission, Arthur Andersen
& Co., an international accounting and consulting firm,
concluded that all the contractors they surveyed
... have been subject to duplicative, overlapping, and
inefficient Government auditing and oversight activities.
The amount of duplication and overlap varies from
contractor to contractor. While most matters of concern
relate to DCAA, Defense Contract Administration Service
(DCAS), and the procuring agencies, several instances were
noted of apparent duplication and inefficiency involving
the Inspector General and General Accounting Office (GAO).
Changes are clearly required to enhance efficiency and
reduce costs to both contractors and the. Government.
[Ref. 2:p. 133]
The CRAG program is designed to ensure that the DOD
oversight is "commensurate with the quality and reliability of
contractor internal control systems." [Ref. 4:p. 17] By
sharing audit and compliance review results through acceptable
internal control systems, both Government and industry will
optimize the benefits of the program.
Other than reduced oversight, additional value accorded
the CRAG program by the Steering Group is as follows:
The value of the CRAG Program to both Government and
industry is that it is a long-term program with a goal of
improving the DOD oversight and procurement processes and
enhancing the image of Government contracting in the eyes
of the Congress and the public .... The CRAG program
provides the framework for industry to demonstrate to the
Government that strong, effective internal controls are in
place and functioning as intended. [Ref. 3:p. i]
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This is supportive of the suggestion by the Packard Commission
that "contractors must do much more than they have done in the
past to comply with contractual, regulcxtory, and statutory
standards." [Ref. 2:p. 7]
The CRAG has been in existence for more than 4 years and
there continues to be an apparent reluctance by the defense
industrial community to embrace the program. Many seem still
unconvinced that oversight reduction can be a reality. This
thesis will examine available data to draw conclusions about
the relative success or failure of the CRAG program to meet
its objectives.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The objectives of this study are to review and evaluate
contractors' participation in the CRAG program to (1) assess
the CRAG program since its implementation to analyze the
achievement of its goals, (2) identify any deficiencies in the
CRAG as it exists, (3) recommend any additions, modifications
or deletions to/from the program to correct deficiencies and
(4) gain a better understanding of the relationship between
the Government and the defense industry during the exercise of
oversight responsibilities in the performance of a contract.
An additional objective of this study is to present a forum
whereby Government and industry can share information so that
they will better comprehend each others' positions with regard
to participation in the CRAG program and correct any
5
misconceptions about the benefits of this or a similar
program.
The intended goal of this research is to provide
information input that will facilitate the improvement of the
efficiency and effectiveness of Government oversight
responsibilities by DOD and industry activities.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The scope of this thesis is to assess the CRAG program
since its implementation in 1988 to include an analysis of the
achievement of its goals and whether any modifications are
required. Not every contractor and not every DOD agency with
oversight responsibility was given the opportunity to give
input for inclusion in the study. A representative sample of
primary Government activities and defense industry
corporations was solicited for comments and opinions about the
program and its goals.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the stated objectives, the following primary
research question is presented: To what extent has the CRAG
program achieved its goals and objectives and what
modifications, if any, should be made to the program to
increase its use and improve its benefits to both Government
and the defense industry?
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In support of the primary question, the following
subsidiary questions were developed to help analyze the CRAG
program:
"* What is the CRAG and what are its key objectives?
"* What areas of the CRAG do contractors choose/not choose to
participate in and what is their reaction to the program
as a whole? What are the views of contractors actively
involved in any aspect of the program and the views of
those who are not participants?
"* What is the Government's position on implementation of the
CRAG program?
"* What have been the principal deficiencies in the CRAG as
noted by both Government and industry representatives and
what actions can be taken to correct those deficiencies?
"* What are the changes to be made to the CRAG to enhance its
effectiveness? Should the program be more directed or
should it be replaced by an alternative program? Should
the goals be altered through greater emphasis,
deemphasized or completely changed?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The method for conducting the study involved a review of
the existing literature on the CRAG, surveys mailed to a
number of primary defense contractors, surveys mailed to a
number of Government activities with oversight
responsibilities, and phone and personal interviews with
Government and contractor personnel.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter I contains
an introduction to the scope, purpose and methodology of the
study and the research questions utilized in this study.
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Chapter II provides the background of the CRAG program which
encompasses the state of defense acquisition prior to the
Packard Commission and the development of the CRAG. Also
included in Chapter II are the concepts of self-governance and
internal controls, an overview of the CRAG objectives, and the
responsibilities of all parties involved in CRAG.
Chapters III and IV contain the results of the research
questionnaires for industry and Government, respectively.
Included in each cinpter are the responses to each question,
with a graphical presentation of the results and their
numerical distribution, and analyses of the results. Also
included in Chapters III and IV are general observations made
by the researcher in the course of the study.
Chapter V provides conclusions formulated from the
research of the CRAG program and provides recommendations for
program improvement. Additionally, all research questions are
summarized and areas suggested for further study are
identified.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PUBLIC TRUST AND THE CALL FOR REFORM
Prior to and throughout the 1980's, the defense industry
was plagued by many well-publicized scandals and allegations
of mismanagement that resulted in the fraudulent misuse of
public funds and a degradation of the public trust with
regard to defense procurement practices. A precursor to these
events was an increase in the defense budget of 100% in 1972
dollars from 1972 until 1988, with the largest portion of that
increase occurring during the years from 1981 - 1986 when the
Government was building up the military. At that time, there
was much public support for the military buildup, as depicted
in Figure 1, with a majority of the populace agreeing that
money was no object, as depicted in Figure 2.
The sheer size of the defense budget, even in 1986, was
staggering. Annual purchases by DOD totaled more than $170
billion, which made it the largest business enterprise in the
world. The total number of contract actions approached 15
million annually, or 56,000 daily contract actions [Ref. 8:p.
3]. Additionally, these contract actions are spread over a
prime contractor base in excess of 60,000, with a supporting
structure of hundreds of thousands of other contractors and





Figure 1: Necessity Of Military Buildup During The 1980's
(Source: Ref. 6:p. 21)
Don't know, refused (1.0%)
Disagree (35.0%)
Agree (63.0%)
In between. both (10%)
Figure 2: Spending Whatever Is Necessary For Defense
(Source: Ref. 7 :p. 84)
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the procurement actions went to a group of 100 contractors, 25
of them performing on more than $1 billion in contracts each,
147 of them at more than $100 million and about 6,000
contractors at $1 million or more [Ref. 2:p. 1].
With the large number of contractors competing for the
growing defense dollars, the potential for misuse and
misrepresentation of public funds increased. Along with the
build-up during the early to mid 1980's was an increase in the
disclosures of waste and inefficiency [Ref. 10:p. 17]. As
evidence of this misuse or misrepresentation the following is
presented:
As of May, 1985, 131 separate investigations were pending
against 45 of DOD's 100 largest contractors. These
involved such issues as defective pricing, cost and labor
mischarging, product substitution, subcontractor kickbacks
and false claims. From June 1983 to April 1985, 12
separate investigations were instituted against one major
contractor alone. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
"Public confidence in the effectiveness of the defense
acquisition system has been shaken by a spate of 'horror
stories'." [Ref. 8:p. 1] The horror stories contained in
Table 1 represent some of the cost and pricing atrocities that
were being discovered and were given front page coverage in
the news media. While the media reported the cost
discrepancy, they did not necessarily report the outcome of
the investigation.
Eleanor Spector, Director of Defense Procurement
summarized the media coverage as follows:
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Acerbic journalists have informed us all the nation's
scientists, engineers and manufacturers of especially
high-technology products exploit that ignorance (of
acquisition personnel) because they are gifted in larceny.
Their talents run not to putting a man on the moon or
devising an effective national defense, but to making
outrageously priced toilet seats, stool caps and claw
hammers. [Ref. 11:p. 30]
You heard about the But did you hear that
$400 Claw Hammer DOD identified the overcharge
and obtained a refund from the
contractor
$110 Diode DOD identified the
overcharge and obtained a
refund from the contractor
$9,000 Hex Wrench DOD identified the overcharge
and refused to pay
$1,100 Plastic DOD identified the Stool Cap
overcharge, obtained a refund,
and gave an $1,100 award to the
Air Force Sergeant who
challenged the price.
(Source: Ref. 12, p. 248)
TABLE I: SPARE PARTS STORY
As a result of the publication of these incidents, the
public perception of the management of the defense industry
went into a tailspin. Not only did this perception of gross
wrongdoings exist, it was also felt by 89% of the public that
the problems were solvable. While it was unclear who was to
blame for the debacle in defense spending, confidence was
expressed that President Reagan, followed by national leaders
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from outside Government, would find the means to reduce the
waste and fraud in defense spending. [Ref. 13:p. 191]
B. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12526
On July 15, 1985, President Reagan signed Executive Order
12526 establishing the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management. The commission consisted of 16 members
who were appointed by the President. These members were
people renowned within commerce and industry and people with
extensive experience in Government and national defense. Mr.
David Packard was chosen as the chairman.
The mission of the Blue Ribbon Commission was to study the
management policies and procedures of the Department of
Defense inciuding the related activities of the Congress. The
four broad areas under study were the budget process, the
procurement system, legislative oversight and the
organizational and operational arrangements of the DOD. Three
of the eight specific directives given to the Commission
included:
"* Review the adequacy of the defense acquisition process,
the adequacy of the defense industrial base, current law
governing Federal and Department of Defense procurement
activities, departmental directives and management
procedures, and the execution of acquisition
responsibilities within the Military Departments.
"* Study and make recommendations concerning congressional
oversight and investigative procedures relating to the
Department of Defense.
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* Recommend how to improve the effectiveness and stability
of resources allocation for defense, including the
legislative process. [Ref 14 :p. 1-21
The Panel was known as the Packard Commission (named after
its chairman) and made recommendations on the procurement
section on 31 December, 1985. Their final report was
submitted on 30 June, 1986.
C. THE PACKARD COMMISSION
As incident after incident of waste in weapons procurement
hit the news in the mid 1980's, it was "becoming clearer that
there was something more than stupidity, wrong doing, and
inefficiency involved in Pentagon procurement." [Ref. 15:p.
451 There was a consensus that procurement itself was at
fault and that over-regulation, over-specification, over-
planning and over-centralization, and over-coziness between
program management and contractor personnel were the causes
[Ref. 15:p. 4 51.
In April, 1985, Representative William L. Dickinson (AL),
the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee,
expressed his concern to President Reagan that the negative
publicity that surrounded defense procurement was resulting in
too many reactive, uncoordinated efforts at reform and was
diminishing the public support of defense spending [Ref. 16:p.
21]. It was his contention that it was necessary to
"consolidate piecemeal legislative attempts to correct
Pentagon procurement abuses." [Ref. 17 :p. 17] There was
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growing concern that Congress was actually impeding true
reform by mandating legislation that was 180 degrees away from
what was considered professional purchasing practice
[Ref. 18:p. 821.
It was the suggestion of Representative Dickinson and
others to President Reagan that he establish a presidential
blue ribbon panel on Government procurement reform [Ref. 1 7 :p.
171. In addition to the suggestion of his key advisors and
the growing number of publicized defense scandals, President
Reagan decided to create the commission because of his broad
concern about the growing number and complexity of contract
procedures and regulations that had accumulated over a 40 year
period [Ref. 16:p. 201. In addition to Mr. Packard, the
Commission consisted of 15 other individuals who represented
the business, legal and academic communities [Ref. 16:p. 201.
One of the major tasks of the Packard Commission was to
... evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine
how it might be improved, and to recommend changes that
can lead to the acquisition of military equipment with
equal or greater performance but at a lower cost and with
less delay. [Ref. 8:p. 11
As part of the evaluation, the Commission examined acquisition
cases involving both major weapon system purchases and spare
parts procurements and identified the following problems that
occurred with frequency:
... government insistence on rigid custom specifications
for products, despite the commercial availability of
adequate alternative items costing much less; the ordering
of spare parts so late in a program, after the close of
the production line, that they must be expensively hand
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tooled; the use of unsuitable cost allocation procedures
that grossly distort the price tags of inexpensive spare
parts; the buying of spare parts in uneconomically small
quantities and hence at higher prices; and the simple
exercise of poor judgment by acquisition personnel.
In general, we discovered, these problems were seldom
the result of fraud or dishonesty. Rather they were
symptomatic of other underlying problems that affect the
entire acquisition system. [Ref. B:p. 5]
As stated by William J. Perry, a member of the Packard
Commission, a primary conclusion of the Commission was that
.. defense acquisition was unacceptably inefficient .... It
is not the result of deviations from or abuses of the
system, but instead is a direct consequence of the system
itself. [Ref. 19:p. 801
They further found that some cases
... involved violations of specific contractual and
regulatory provisions. Many of these violations have
resulted from management failure to establish internal
controls to assure compliance with unique DOD
requirements. Contractors historically relied on DOD
auditors to identify instances where standards were not
followed, and contractor failure to establish interndl
controls has developed in this regulated environment.
[Ref. 7:p. 801
In its final report, the Packard Commission concluded that
... self-governance is the most promising mechanism to
foster improved contract compliance. It follows that each
contractor must individually initiate, develop, implement,
and enforce those elements of corporate governance that
are critical to contract compliance, including a proper
code of conduct. The extent of each contractor's efforts
in doing so will reflect the level of reputation for
integrity it intends to set for itself. [Ref 7:p. 841
The recommendations to correct deficiencies in DOD
procurement management addressed many functional areas from
many differing perspectives. With regard to the development
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and implementation of better internal control systems, the
Commission made the following proposals:
"* Establish internal auditing of compliance with Government
contracting procedures, corporate standards of conduct and
other requirements. Such auditing should review actual
compliance as well as the effectiveness of internal
control systems.
"* Design systems of internal control to ensure that they
cover, among other things, compliance with the
contractor's standards of ethical business conduct.
"* Establish internal audit staffs sufficient in numbers,
professional background and training to the volume, nature
and complexity of the company's government contracts
business.
"* Establish sufficient direct reporting channels from
internal auditors to the independent audit committee of
the contractor's board of directors to assure the
independence and objectivity of the audit function.... To
encourage and preserve the vitality of such an internal
auditing and reporting process, the DOD should develop
appropriate guidelines heavily circumscribing the use of
investigative subpoenas to compel disclosure of contractor
internal auditing materials. (Ref. 20:p. 42-44]
D. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE
Concurrent with the work of the Packard Commission, a
group of leading defense contractors met and formulated six
principles regarding the proper conduct of business which
became known as the Defense Industry Initiatives (DII) on
Business Ethics and Conduct. One of the determinations made
by the Packard Commission in its Interim Report to President
Reagan was that corporate self-governance combined with
internally enforced codes of ethics would facilitate the
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appropriate conduct of defense contractors. Specifically the
Interim Report stated
To assure that their houses are in order, defense
contractors must promulgate and vigilantly enforce codes
of ethics that address the unique problems and procedures
incident to defense procurement. They must also develop
and implement internal controls to monitor these codes of
ethics and sensitive aspects of contract compliance. [Ref
21:p. 55]
In response to this sentiment, the DII promoted ethical
business conduct by its signatories adopting and demonstrating
policies and procedures in six areas:
"* Codes of ethics;
"* Ethics training;
"* Internal reporting of alleged misconduct;
"* Self-governance through the implementation of systems to
monitor compliance with federal procurement laws and the
adoption of procedures for voluntary disclosure of
violations to the appropriate authorities;
"* Responsibility to the industry;
"* Accountability to the public. [Ref 22:p. 1]
The intent of this effort was to show that the defense
industry was capable of governing itself in ethical matters,
thereby regaining the public trust that had been placed in
question. It was also an attempt to bolster the image of the
defense industry in matters of contract compliance with
Government rules and regulations. Only a minimal number of
the total number of defense contractors have become
signatories to the DII. By 1990, only 46 companies formally
18
adopted these principles, but they represented over 50% of
DOD's annual procurement spending. [Ref. 23:p. 354]
While the DII has always been a program designed for large
companies, its concepts apply to any Government contractor and
should be tailored for implementation based on the company's
size and nature and volume of Government business [Ref. 24:p.
57]. The policy of the DOD with regard to employment and
implementation of contractor standards of conduct is similar
to the precepts contained in the DII. It is the policy of the
DOD that
Government contractors must conduct themselves with the
highest degree of integrity and honesty. Contractors
should have standards of conduct and internal control
systems that:
"* Are suitable to the size of the company and the extent of
their involvement in Government contracting,
"* Promote such standards,
"* Facilitate timely discovery and disclosure of improper
conduct in connection with Government contracts, and
"* Ensure corrective measures are promptly instituted and
carried out. [Ref. 25:Subpart 203.7000]
The procedures for implementing such a policy are found in
the DOD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
These procedures state that
A contractor's system of management controls should
provide for:
"* A written code of business ethics and conduct and an
ethics training program for all employees;
"* Periodic reviews of company business practices,
procedures, policies, and internal controls for compliance
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with standards of conduct and the special requirements of
Government contracting;
"* A mechanism, such as a hotline, by which employees may
report suspected instances of improper conduct, and
instructions that encourage employees to make such
reports;
"* Internal and/or external audits, as appropriate;
"* Disciplinary action for improper conduct;
"* Timely reporting to appropriate Government officials of
any suspected or possible violation of law in connection
with Government contracts or any other irregularities in
connection with such contracts; and
"* Full cooperation with any Government agencies responsible
for either investigation or corrective actions.
[Ref. 25:Subpart 203.7001]
E. THE CRAG STEERING GROUP
During 1988, individuals representing the various elements
of the DOD formed a steering group to formulate a plan to
implement the recommendation of the Packard Commission that
contractors should develop strong internal control systems.
Members of this group included Eleanor Spector, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement); June Gibbs
Brown, DODIG; and William H. Reed, Director, DCAA. The
product of their efforts was the CRAG which provided the
framework for the defense industry to demonstrate to the
Government that internal controls were in place, operational
and functioning as intended [Ref. 3:p. i]. Prior to the
issuance of the final version of the CRAG, industry's comments
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and suggestions were solicited and reviewed for inclusion in
the program [Ref. 26:p. 72].
The CRAG includes "a series of controls aimed at ensuring
that indirect cost claims, proposals and billings applicable
to U. S. Government contracts are prepared and submitted in
accordance with federal laws and regulations." [Ref. 27:p. 87]
The CRAG program was developed as follows:
"* High risk areas for Government contracting were
identified.
"* Overall control objectives and major controls were
developed for each high-risk area that was identified.
"* A list of commonly used control procedures was developed
for each major control. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
The high risk areas identified were indirect cost submissions,
labor charging, material management and accounting systems,
estimating systems and purchasing.
The CRAG was developed to help prevent an adversarial
relationship between the defense industry and DOD, assist
contractors in the pursuit of efficiency and improved quality
and make DOD oversight resources available for other uses
[Ref. 28:p. 141]. The benefits originally envisioned through
implementation of the CRAG included:
1. For industry:
"* Strengthened internal control systems related to
contractual adherence to Federal procurement
regulations.
"* Enhance [the company's public] image.
"* Reduced incidence of civil and criminal prosecutions
and attendant fines and penalties.
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0 Better understanding of DOD oversight objectives and
review criteria used to assure contractor adherence
to Federal procurement regulations.
* Favorable consideration in debarment proceedings.
* Reduced Government oversight, with emphasis on
elimination of duplicative oversight wherever reliance
can be placed on work performed by the contractor.
2. For Government:
"* Improved efficiency and effectiveness of oversight
operations.
"* Greater reliance on contractor internal control
systems in establishing the scope of Government
oversight.
"* Focused oversight activity on areas where ineffective
controls exist.
3. For both Government and industry:
"* Better communications and working relationship between
the DOD and industry.
"* Improved credibility of the DOD contracting process in
the eyes of the Congress and the public. [Ref. 3:p.2]
While these were the expected benefits, there existed an
attitude by contractors that different divisions of DOD had
given them varying guidance regarding procurement policy [Ref.
26:p. 721. Because of that feeling, there were many
reservations about an inconsistent application of the CRAG
program from contractor to contractor [Ref. 27:p. 87]. These
reservations surfaced even though it had been advertised to
the contractors that this was an internally coordinated DOD
effort where all DOD agencies were involved [Ref. 28:p. 72].
While the program was conceptually sound, cultural changes
were required by both industry and Government for the program
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to succeed. Voluntary participation by contractors was
incentivized by the possibility of reduced oversight. The
CRAG was not warmly received at its inception as only a
handful of contractors had agreed to participate by the end of
April, 1989. [Ref. 29:p. 87]
F. THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT (DMR)
In February, 1989, President Bush tasked Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney in National Security Review Directive 11
to develop a plan for fully implementing the recommendations
of the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act [Ref. l:p. 166]. The result was the Report
to the President on Defense Management which was presented in
July, 1989. "The DMR was not meant to be a revolutionary
approach to the business of defense acquisition." [Ref. 30:p.
551 The report merely "...established a broad agenda to
accomplish full implementation of the recommendations [of the
Packard Commission] and to realize substantial savings
overall." [Ref. 31:p. 14] Additionally, the DMR provided a
plan for substantl'a.y improving the performance of the
defense acquisition system and more effective management of
the DoD and its resources [Ref. 32:p. 8].
Among other things, the DMR identified requirements to
"* Reduce significantly the number of programs that overrun
their budgets, are late, or technically deficient;
"* Establish and enforce high ethical standards of conduct in
DOD and the defense industry;
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* Reduce micromanagement and simplify the laws and
regulations governing DOD;
* Reverse the decline in the industrial base; and
* Improve relations among Congress, DOD, and the defense
industry. [Ref. 31:p. 14]
The report stated Secretary Cheney's support for the DOD
self-governance program and his view that the program be
adopted by the defense contractors voluntarily [Ref. l:p.
170]. He recommended that contractor self-governance, where
industry management assumes new responsibilities for the
oversight of their contract operations, be greatly improved
and that the DOD exercise its management and oversight
responsibilities more effectively [Ref. 33:p. 11]. His report
stated that contractor self-governance, when supported by law
enforcement, "is the most promising additional mechanism to
foster compliance with the high standards expected of DOD
suppliers". [Ref. 34:p. 19]
The DMR supports expanded participation in the CRAG
program as a way of improving the effectiveness and efficiency
of Government oversight through contractor self-governance
[Ref. 1:p. 1701. One should realize, however, that "self-
governance programs do not replace Government oversight."
[Ref. 34:p. 19] Self-governance programs, such as CRAG,
"encourage DOD contractors to develop more effective internal
control systems and thereby reduce the burden on the
Government to provide external oversight." [Ref. 35:p. 10]
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G. SELF-GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROLS
Contractor self-governance and internal controls are two
areas that were addressed by the Packard Commission and that
required improvement. They said:
Contractors will be required to do much more t>-.l they
have done in the past to comply with contractual,
regulatory, and statutory standards and to provide
adequate supervision and instruction for employees. To do
so will necessitate their putting in place broad and
effective systems of internal control. [Ref. 7:p. 80]
"Government contractors should have the necessary systems
and controls to satisfy regulatory compliance requirements and
police their own activities." [Ref. 24:p. 57] "Free choice
of governance ... is considered to be important, and
regulating to impose standard forms of governance is viewed as
unnecessary and potentially harmful." [Ref. 36:p. 113] It
was the feeling of the Packard Commission that "Government
actions should foster contractor self-governance." [Ref. 7:p.
xxix] Additionally, "Government action should not impede
efforts by contractors to improve their own performance. The
(Packard) Commission is concerned that, for example,
overzealous use of investigative subpoenas by Defense
Department agencies may result in less vigorous internal
corporate auditing." [Ref. 7:p. xxvii] To emphasize the
importance of self-governance, the Packard Commission stated
that
Excellence in defense management can not be achieved by
the numerous management layers, large staffs and countless
regulations in place today .... Excellence in defense
management will not be achieved through legions of
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Government auditors, inspectors and investigators. It
depends on the honest partnership of thousands of
responsible contractors and DOD, each equally committed to
proper control of its own operations. [Ref 7:p. xiii]
Figure 3 shows the five key components and their inter-
relationships of a typical Government contzact compliance and
self-governance program. One of the key components of this
Figure 3: Self-Govenance Progr -- Integrated Syste
Approach
(Source: Ref 24:p. 60)
model is the monitoring function which may consist of several
different disciplines. [Ref. 24 :p. 60]
The timing of this monitoring or oversight is important.
It has been stated that
... compliance monitoring is most effective if done on a
real-time basis. Therefore, supervisory and operational
reviews and controls must be part of any self-governance
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program. Operational oversight is a day-to-day activity
intended to ensure company employees are aware of,
understand and follow company policies and procedures. If
a company has an internal audit function, it should have
a major role in monitoring compliance as part of its
normal audit process. [Ref. 24:p. 60]
Of course, internal audit is only one aspect of self-
governance. There exist many other elements to self-
governance programs.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) defined internal control as
... a process, effected by an entity's board of directors,
management and other personnel, designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
objectives in each of the following categories:
"* Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
"* Reliability of financial reporting.
"* Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
[Ref. 37:p. 30]
While these are the broad categories of objectives of
internal control systems, COSO also identified five components
that comprise internal controls. The five components
including some of their factors are as follows:
"* Control Environment - The core of any business is its
people - their individual attributes, including integrity,
ethical values and competence - and the environment in
which they operate.
"* Risk Assessment - The entity must be aware of and deal
with the risks it faces. It must set objectives
integrated with the sales, production, marketing,
financial and other activities of the organization is
operating in concert. It also must establish mechanisms
to identify, analyze and manage the related risks.
"* Control Activities - Control policies and procedures must
be established and executed to help ensure the actions
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identified by management as necessary to address risks to
achieve the entity's objectives are carried out
effectively.
"* Information and Communications - Surrounding these
activities are various information and communication
systems. These enable the entity's people to capture and
exchange the information needed to conduct, manage and
control its operations.
"* Monitoring - The entire process must be monitored, with
modifications made as necessary. In this way, the system
can react dynamically, changing as conditions warrant.
[Ref. 37:p. 31]
In summary the objectives delineate what a corporation
strives to achieve and the components delineate what is needed
for achievement of the objectives. To determine whether or
not an internal control system is effective, a subjective
evaluation must be conducted to assess if the five components
are present and functioning properly. [Ref. 37 :p. 30-31]
H. THE CRAG PROGRAM
The CRAG was implemented in November, 1988, as a voluntary
program with the intent of improving DOD's oversight of
contractors and to foster the concept of contractor self-
governance through stronger contractor internal control
systems [Ref. 34:p. 201. "Contractors who can demonstrate
implementation of internal control systems that meet
acceptable objectives are to be considered for reduced
oversight." [Ref. 28:p. 141]
Through development of the CRAG, DOD has attempted to
answer the following questions and maintain a proactive role
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in streamlining the oversight function of Government
purchasing:
"* What are fair and equitable oversight levels?
"* Is oversight under control?
"* What are fair oversight criteria?
"* Can contractor self-governance affect oversight? [Ref.
4:p. 151
While the contractor makes the decision on which chapters of
the CRAG that he desires to participate in, the Government
retains the decision on the appropriate amount of oversight
for the selected functional areas, depending on the
acceptability of the contractor's program.
As stated in Chapter 1, there are five areas of the
procurement field that are included as chapters of the CRAG
program: Indirect Cost Submission, Labor Charging, Material
Management and Accounting Systems, Estimating Systems and
Purchasing. Each chapter of the CRAG has its own control
objective. Requirements for major controls in support of each
control objective are also delineated to ensure that the
contractor's internal control systems encompass all the
requirements of the individual high-risk areas. The
objectives and major controls for each chapter of the CRAG are
included as Appendix B to this study.
Of course, participation in the CRAG doesn't just happen.
Both the contractor and the Government have responsibilities
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that have to be satisfied in order for the program to work.
Contractors desiring participation in the CRAG program shall
"* Notify the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) of the
risk areas in which the contractor plans to participate in
the CRAG program.
"* Describe and document the policies, procedures and
controls that define the system addressing the contractor
risk area(s).
"* Describe and document the program for training employees
(where appropriate) in these procedures and policies.
"* Describe and document the mechanism(s) utilized to monitor
and test the system.
"* Demonstrate, in a manner mutually agreed to with the ACO
and cognizant DOD oversight activity, that the system is
functioning as described.
"* Maintain continuing surveillance over the internal control
system to assure that the CRAG objectives are being met.
[Ref. 38:p. iii]
The responsibilities of the ACO include these:
"* Arrange for the contractor to meet the appropriate DOD
oversight official.
"* Advise off-site DOD oversight activities of the existence
and status of the CRAG program.
"* Help prevent duplicative and overlapping oversight.
"* Work with the appropriate oversight official to ensure
that oversight levels are commensurate with the quality
and reliability of a contractor's internal control
systems. [Ref. 4:p. 161
The appropriate DOD oversight activity or official will
"* Establish with the contractor a coordination process for
ensuring that the DOD is aware fully of the contractor's
plans and accomplishments.
"* Integrate the effect of the contractor's efforts into
planned oversight activities.
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* Inform the contractor and the ACO, through periodic
meetings, of the extent to which contractor activities
have influenced the scope of DOD oversight. [Ref. 38:p.
iv]
In addition to these responsibilities, in order for the
CRAG program to be successful, there must be a commitment on
the part of both corporate management and Government
authorities and an active implementation of the program at the
operating level [Ref. 34:p. 191.
I. SUMKARY
Scandals and fraud within the defense community and
Government procurement during the early 1980's were
responsible for numerous calls for reform by the public, the
legislature and the Administration. This public outcry
resulted in the formulation of the Packard Commission, whi-h
made recommendations for better management of the DoD, the
birth of the DII, which was industry's plan for practicing and
promoting a higher standard of business ethics, and the DMR,
which reported on the progress of the DoD's implementation of
the recommendations of the Packard Commission.
One outgrowth of these events was the initiation of the
CRAG program. Since its implementation, the guiding
principles of the CRAG to promote contractor self-governance
have not changed. Additionally, the five high-risk areas
included as chapters in the CRAG have not changed nor have any
other risk areas been added to expand the program's coverage.
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The next chapter will address the views of the defense
contractors about the CRAG because of their experience with it
and attempt to determine the level of support for continuing
the program as it is, make changes to it or completely cancel
it.
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III. DEFENSE INDUSTRY OPINIONS AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
From its inception in 1988, participation in the CRAG
program by the defense industry has been minimal. When the
program first began, only six companies were participants.
Because of increased emphasis and promotion of the program by
the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC), the number of
participants more than doubled to 13 by May of 1990 [Ref. 3b
and Ref. 39:p. 701]. The number of companies and divisions
participating in CRAG continued to grow and, by May 31, 1991,
there were 93 participants [Ref. 34:p. 101.
Defense industry professional organizations such as the
Institute of Internal Auditors, CODSIA and the Aerospace
Industry Association are proactive in supporting many of the
initiatives that encourage self-governance and promote its
concepts. An example is Coordinated Audit Planning, whereby
the contractors and the Government work together to formulate
audit plans. As recently as March of 1993, a workshop was
conducted where industry and Government representatives shared
their lessons learned with regard to audit planning, which
included CRAG implementation and experiences.
In an effort to determine the opinions of industry about
the CRAG program, including its benefits, its problems and
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modification/cancellation recommendations, a questionnaire was
sent to 150 defense contractors representing the top 100
defense contractors in 1990 and suppliers to the Navy Aviation
Supply Office. The questionnaire is included as Appendix C.
Of the 150 questionnaires mailed, 63 were returned,
representing a 42% return rate. The results are included
herewith.
B. SURVEY QUESTIONS 2
1. Question #2, Familiarity With CRAG:
Are you familiar with the CRAG program and its
benefits? If familiar what are the top three benefits?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses3 :
Figure 4 represents responses to question 2.
b. Contractor Comwents:
Comments from the contractors varied with regard to
their level of familiarity with the CRAG program.
When considering the benefits of the CRAG program,
responses varied across the spectrum from completely positive
to completely negative. The most positive responses include
improved communications between contractor and Government
2Question #1 requested the name of the company, name of the
person completing the questionnaire and other data that are not
included in this thesis.
3All graphs include the response category, the number of
responses in that category and the percentage represented by each
response category.
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No Answer 1 (1.6%) •Not Familiar 9 (12 J-)
- tmiiirr 54 (85.7%()-
Figjutre 4: Famil.iar'ity With CRAG
personnel, better working relationships between the parties,
improved internal control systems, reduced levels of oversight
and a reduction in the amount of duplicative audits.
The more negative responses include the feeling
that benefits are minimal because the contractors, although
they have internal controls in place, cannot satisfy the
requirements of oversight activities because of a high
turnover of Government personnel, each with his own
interpretation of the program. Another negative comment was
that there were no benefits because of the resources and time
required to establish and maintain the systems.
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c. Analysis:
The researcher expected to see a high level of
contractor familiarity with the CRAG because of the heavy
promotion the program received during the first two years
after its implementation as shown in the literature research.
With 85% of the respondents acknowledging familiarity with the
program, the researcher feels that the CRAG has been
adequately publicized as being available for contractor
consideration in the formulation of business and audit plans.
Based upon the data received from industry
respondents, the three most prevalent benefits, listed in
order by highest number of responses, were better
communications (35), better working relationships (34), and
improved internal control systems (28). Because reduced
Government oversight is a primary goal of the CRAG program, it
was anticipated that reduced oversight would be reported as
one of the top three benefits perceived by the respondents.
However, only 20 responses reported that this aspect of the
CRAG was a top benefit. This indicates to the researcher that
the contractors perceive the CRAG as more of a management tool
rather than a means to do away with Government auditors.
2. Questions #3 and #3A, Application for Participation:
Has your company applied for participation in the CRAG
program in the past? If not, why not?
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a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 5 represents responses to question 3.
No Answer 9 (14.3%)
"-Did Not Apply 20 (31 7!)
Did Apply 34 (54..T)
Figure 5: Respondents' Application For CRAG Participation
b. Contractor Comments:
Specifically addressing the choice not to
participate in the CRAG program, respondents commented that
the costs of implementing control systems outweigh the
benefits of participation in the program in the near term.
Additionally, some contractors were of the opinion that there
was no benefit to participation in the CRAG program; that
reductions in pre-award reviews translate into increased post-
award reviews or surveillance surveys. They also expressed
the opinion that the Government would not reduce the nature
and extent of oversight.
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Additional comments were received that some non-
participants were awaiting proof of reduced oversight at other
companies who were already participating in the program. They
were content to remain on the sidelines until the CRAG is
proven.
c. Analysis:
Fifty four percent of the respondents applied for
participation in the CRAG program while 32% specifically chose
not to participate.
The 32% who declined to participate in the program
did so because of a number of reasons that point to a
fundamental lack of trust that the Government would actually
reduce the amount of oversight. The basis for this lack of
trust was that these contractors felt oversight would not be
reduced, only shifted to other areas. This is not a valid
basis for non-participation because one of the premises of the
program states that oversight may be shifted or reduced. This
concept is a "given" in the CRAG guide, and not an unintended
hegative side-effect.
Eleven of the twenty contractors who chose not to
participate in the program also expressed as a reason not to
apply for CRAG that the Government personnel performing audit
and review tasks such as the 3-year Contractor Purchasing
Systems Review (CPSR) would continue to be guided by laws and
regulations with no acknowledgment accorded to CRAG
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participation. While a valid concern, only participation in
the program would have proven them right.
Another category of response that surfaced that was
a surprise to the researcher was that, because they already
had internal control systems in place and operating, some
contractors felt they already complied with the intent of the
CRAG without getting formally involved. The reasoning behind
this frame of thought is that to formally participate,
additional resources would have to be expended to refine
current systems that would decrease the corporate or division
"bottom line". In the judgment of the researcher, these
companies would derive an excess of benefits over any
additional costs, in the long run, through formal
participation in the CRAG.
3. Question #3B, Future Application for Participation:
If your company has not applied for participation in
the past, do you foresee the possibility of applying for
participation in the future?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 6 represents responses to question 3B.
b. Analysis:
One of the reasons that some companies are not
participating at present is their preference to await the
results of current participants' success or failure at
achieving reduced oversight. Once the objectives of the CRAG
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No Ansvwr 6 (20.7")
///
/7/ ,,K ///No Future Appi~catio.n 14 (48.3%)
Future Appfcation 9 (31.0%)- 7
Figure 6: Non-participating Respondents Potential For
Future Application In CRAG
program are proved or disproved, additional movement in or out
of the program may follow. Realizing that it has been five
years since the inception of the CRAG, contractors report that
they have seen no published results directly identifying
benefits as a direct result of other companies' participation
in the program. Although results are discussed at some trade
association meetings, no reports of success have been
publicized. The researcher's review of the literature
supports these comments.
For those who continue to opt not to participate in
the program, it is believed by the researcher, because of
input received through personal and phone interviews, that
individual companies' current levels of personnel, finance and
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accounting system resources will continue to constrain them
from undertaking this effort. Given the current downsizing of
the DoD, a few of them are in a "holding" pattern as to the
allocation of their resources for programs such as this.
For these two observations, the researcher cannot
envision any easy resolution that would make a contractor
reconsider his opinions.
4. Question *3C, Planned Expansion or Reduction in CRAG:
If your company has applied for the CRAG program, does
it plan on requesting further expansion or a reduction in its
participation in the program? -
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 7 represents responses to question 3C.
b. Contractor Comments:
Several contractors have only instituted
implementation of one or two chapters of the CRAG. Many of
them are analyzing the results of their partial participation
to date and will make decisions to expand participation based
on that analysis. Others have expressed that their option to
expand participation in the CRAG is contingent on the results
of other companies' successes or failures in selected chapters
of the CRAG.
c. Analysis:
Of the 34 respondents who reported participation in
the CRAG, 53% are full participants, 35% are partial
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No Answer 4 (1 1.8-)-
*- Exponsion 12 (35.3•)
-Reduction 0 (0.01)
FLA Participants 18 (52.9)
Figure 7: CRAG Participants' Planned Expansion/Reduction
In The Program
participants and 12% declined to answer. The 35W who have
expressed an interest in expanding their participation in the
program only need further proof that the CRAG program is
beneficial prior to implementation of other chapters. The two
areas of proof indicated by these respondents as determining
factors in their expansion are published results of other
participants involved in CRAG chapters over and above their
own participation and, because many have only minor practical
experience with limited participation, quantifiable results of
their own participation.
An interesting fact is that, of all the respondents
who participate in the CRAG, not one of them indicated that
they were considering a reduction in program participation.
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It was expected that not all participants would be
sufficiently satisfied with the CRAG to remain part of the
program. This indicates to the researcher two alternatives,
one being that the respondents are satisfied with CRAG
progress toward achieving their corporate goals and the other
being that for some contracLois an insufficient amount of data
are available for an analysis that may have negative results.
5. Question #4, Adequacy of Qualification Description:
Does your company consider the CRAG to be adequate in
its description of the qualifications necessary to participate
in the program?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 8 represents responses to question 4.
b. Contractor Conments:
Many of the respondents who answered that the
descriptions of the CRAG requirements were adequate offered no
additional input. However, a few of the respondents commented
that the requirements were very broad and covered the concepts
in general terms only. Additionally, three of the respondents
stated that, while the requirements were adequate, they were
open to interpretation by the individual Government oversight
official and that some of the officials required additional
training on the CRAG.
For those who answered negatively on this question,
again, many of them also offered no additional input.
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No Answer 10 (15.97)-
Inadequate 8 (12.7%) ",
-Adequote 45 (71 4%)
Figure 8: Adequacy Of Description Of CRAG Qualifications
For Participation
However, one of them relayed that in his opinion the
requirements were not specific enough.
c. Analysis:
The CRAG program delineates the requirements for
contractor participation in each of the five high-risk areas.
While opinions vary on the adequacy of the CRAG program
requirements, clearly a majority of the respondents consider
them appropriate. The CRAG program is based on the premise
that control objectives and major controls are defined, but
that company policies for internal controls will not be
dictated by the Government. Although not specifically stated
in responses to the survey questions, follow-up phone
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interviews with some respondents indicated that the
requirements enhance the concept of an "arm's length
relationship" between Government and industry while promoting
a cooperative atmosphere. They stated that they agree that
internal control systems should not be standardized because
the different structures and complexities of corporations need
to be considered when evaluating participation by contract
area.
It was the judgment of the researcher, due to
preliminary research in the selection of a thesis topic, that
companies didn't fully understand the requirements of the
program. However, the research showed that, in the majority
of the cases, the requirements were understood.
6. Question #5, Areas of Contractor Participation in
CRAG:
Which of the five areas currently delineated in the
CRAG program does your company participate in?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 9 represents responses to question 5.
b. Analysis:
The distribution of companies participating in each
area shows that there is a fairly even level of participation
throughout the program. The only apparent exception in the
distribution is the lesser number of companies participating













Figure 9: Number of Respondents Participating In CRAG By
Chapter
participating in the other four areas included in the CRAG.
This can be attributed to the rigid requirements of the MMAS
as delineated in the DFARS, which mandates that the contractor
must achieve high levels of accuracy (95 - 98%) in the areas
of bills of materials, master production schedule and physical
inventory levels. This may be difficult to achieve because of
the frequently changing environment of the defense
contractors, whereby requirements fluctuate as the Government
directs production acceleration or stretch-out [Ref. 40:p.
521.
It was anticipated by the researcher that a higher
number of current participants in the CRAG would have been
involved in the Purchasing Chapter. The reasoning behind this
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expectation was that because the CPSR is held every 3 years,
with some qualifying companies having interim reviews, in
accordance with the FAR, transition to CRAG participation
might have been relatively simple and would have resulted in
benefits to the participant. However, this expected trend was
not evident in the research.
7. Question #6, Implementation Difficulty.
Did your company experience any difficulties with
implementation of any portion of the CRAG?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 10 represents responses to question 6.
- Difficulty 14 (41 .21)
No Difficulty 20 (58.87.)-A




Lack of commitment and effort by DCAA personnel
were stated in the responses of some contractors as
impediments to implementation because they were of the opinion
that the DCAA personnel were fearful of job loss. Also, they
reported that there is no formal implementation guide for CRAG
participation. The only direction given is that the
contractor needs to contact the ACO about his desires and the
ACO will then coordinate the effort. It is at this point that
the contractors felt a lack of training existed.
Those who didn't experience difficulty in
implementation said that they participated with the Government
personnel in the formulation of an overall plan to institute
CRAG chapters, thereby avoiding problems.
c. Analysis:
In order for implementation of participation in the
CRAG to occur without difficulty, all parties must jointly
formulate a strategy that lays out in detail the requirements
and expectations of all concerned. Both Government and
contractor personnel should make up-front agreements on what
is expected and how those expectations will be achieved.
Included in this strategic plan should be key target dates for
review of progress and identification of milestones leading up
to acceptance of the contractor's internal control system.
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Cooperation and communication are paramount in ensuring a
smooth transition into CRAG participation.
Reports of differences in interpretation of CRAG
guidelines and proposed internal control systems to meet those
guidelines were barriers to a smooth implementation process.
Additional training emphasizing a uniform interpretation of
the guidelines may alleviate this problem in the future.
While a difference in interpretation was the reason behind the
difficulty in the implementation of CRAG in ten of the
fourteen cases, further communication and cooperation on the
part of all parties led to successful implementation. Again,
it shows that a good working relationship is paramount in the
success of the CRAG program.
8. Question #7, CRAG Chapters Not Chosen for
Participation:
Are there any areas of the CRAG that your company
chose not to participate in?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 11 represents responses to question 7.
b. Contractor Comments:
Some participating contractors report that they
choose not to undertake particular chapters of the CRAG
because they see no major benefits in those particular
chapters. For example, in MMAS, one contractor stated that,



















Figure 11: Distribution Of CRAG Participants, By Chapter,
Who Declined Participation In Select Areas
ten key elements, he is already a participant without having
to officially sign up for that chapter of CRAG. Others stated
that they chose not to participate in some chapters because
they wanted to test the program by initiating implementation
of only one or two chapters to judge the benefits of the CRAG
prior to complete participation. Additionally, the comment
was made that in the areas of MMAS and IDC, no one directly
involved with a particular company understood the criteria.
c. Analysis:
The respondents seemed hesitant to participate in
CRAG chapters because of a belief that oversight in those
areas may not be reduced. With regard to misunderstanding the
50
criteria for each chapter, perhaps further training is
required or a refinement of the guidelines might be necessary.
The existence of requirements for programs such as
CPSRs and NMAS reviews, as delineated in the FAR and DFARS, in
the mind of the researcher, should have presented an easy
bridge for participation in the CRAG since the contractors
already comply with those requirements. However, because of
the requirements, contractors not participating in those two
particular chapters felt that they would be subjecting
themselves to additional work because the oversight activities
had to perform those reviews without regard to CRAG
participation. It had been an expectation that these two
areas would have had more participation for reasons given in
paragraph 5 (c) of this section.
9. Question *8, Reduction In Oversight:
Is your company experiencing any reduction in the
amount or level of Government oversight because of your
participation in the CRAG program?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 12 represents responses to question 8.
b. Contractor Comments:
Many contractors who experienced a reduction in the
amount of oversight claim that they are receiving fewer DCAA
audits or reduced audit scope. Others have reported reduced
DCAA headcounts in their plants. Since the implementation of
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No Reduction 16 (47.1% Rd ( / Reduction 18 (52.9-)
Figure 12: CRAG Participants Experiencing Reduced
Oversight
CRAG at their activities, one firm reported a decrease of DCAA
auditors from 14 to 10; another reported a decrease from 59 to
50; and one other reported a decrease from 139 in 1989 to only
84 by the end of 1992. It was also expressed that the
reductions in oversight are a result of increased
communication and coordination between Government and industry
personnel.
For those who experienced no reduction in
oversight, some of them commented that their implementation
was too recent and that not enough data were available to make
a determination. Others stated that although they are
participants and their internal control systems have been
approved for CRAG, the Government oversight activities
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disregard the contractor's results and continue to perform
full transaction analysis and program reviews.
c. Analysis:
Of the 34 companies reporting participation in the
CRAG program, only 53% report reduced oversight. A review of
the literature and the stated intent of the CRAG led the
researcher to believe that the percentage of participants
receiving a reduction in Government oversight should have been
higher. To achieve a higher rate of reduction, it is the
judgment of the researcher that more experience with the CRAG
program is required with some companies to quantify the level
of oversight encountered. Eight of the sixteen respondents
reporting no reduction indicated that there was insufficient
data available because their imDlementation was too recent.
Additionally, as more cooperative and trusting
relationships between the contractors and the oversight
activities develop, the researcher feels that additional
reductions will occur because of an increase in the
confidence in contractor self-governance. Further research
will prove or disprove this hypothesis.
10. Question #9, Increase In Oversight:
Is your company experiencing an increase in the amount
or level of Government oversight because of your participation
in the CRAG program?
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a. Results of Survey:
Experienced Increased Oversight 0
b. Contractor Comments:
While no increase in total oversight was reported,
some contractors did comment that, for a reduction of
oversight in a CRAG covered area, an equivalent amount of
oversight effort was shifted to areas not covered by the CRAG.
c. Analysis:
As expected because of the design of the CRAG
program, no increase of oversight was reported by any
participants in the program. While oversight resources were
transferred to other areas in some cases, no increase was
experienced by any participant. The CRAG supports this
transfer of oversight effort as it is one of the premises on
which the program is based.
Many of the contractors who reported neither a
reduction nor an increase in oversight are withholding
opinions until they have more experience with the CRAG as
explained in the previous subsection.
11. Question *10, Maintaining Compliance with CRAG:
What areas of the CRAG program cause you the most
difficulty in maintaining compliance with the procurement
regulations?
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a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
















Figure 13: CRAG Participants With Difficulty Maintaining
Compliance By Chapter
b. Contractor Comments:
Reasons given for difficulty in maintaining
compliance within each area of the CRAG include the
subjectivity with which the guidelines and regulations are
interpreted and the dynamically changing procurement
regulation environment of DOD contracting. Additionally,
contractors commented that in some areas, such as ES and PUR,
the rules were not well defined and resulted in differing




The ability to maintain compliance with the rules
and regulations of the DOD procurement system will vary from
contractor to contractor depending upon the utilization of
resources and the ethical and prudent business decisions of
the employees. The responses clearly indicate that the two
areas causing the most difficulty in maintaining compliance
are Estimating Systems and Purchasing. The reasons for this
trend appears to be that these two areas, while requiring
rigid procedures for implementation, contain rules that are
subject to wide variation in interpretation. Additionally,
the regulatory environment in which they operate is multi-
dimensional and under constant scrutiny for modification and
alteration, resulting in added confusion as to what methods
and regulations are actually current.
12. Question #11, Recommendations For CRAG Improvement:
What recommendations does your company have that would
improve the CRAG program as it exists?
a. Contractor Comments
Respondents relayed their opinions that they would
like to see stronger participation by the ACOs in the
administration of the CRAG effort and that they considered the
training accorded the ACO and DCAA representatives inadequate
and recommended additional formalized training. An
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overwhelming feeling of the contractors was that a formalized
quid pro quo be agreed upon at the initiation of program
participation, a commensurate reduction in oversight for
approved contractor internal control systems.
b. Analysis:
Because of the concept that any action by either
party to a contract is due proper consideration by the other
party for the stated action, as long as it is within the scope
of the conduct of the contract, the researcher entered this
study with the notion that viable quid pro quo was inherent in
the CRAG program. The emphasis placed on an actual quid pro
quo was very apparent in a number of responses received.
There is an aura of reluctance on the part of the contractors
to believe that they will actually get anything in return for
Lheir effcrts. This, again, goes back to the trust addressed
earlier in the study.
Training of both the Government and contractor
personnel on CRAG issues has been developed as a problem area
that was unexpected by the researcher. While initial training
was held, continuous training has not been addressed but needs
to be. As a result of this perceived lack of training, a
final observation can be made that if the training were
continual, increased participation by the ACO throughout the
process would follow which, in turn, would satisfy the rate of
participation sought by the contractors.
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13. Question #12, Recomendations For New CRAG Chapters:
Are there any areas that your company would like to
have included in the CRAG program and why?
a. Contractor CoAments:
Of all the responses, including those by phone and
personal interviews, the only two areas that were mentioned
for development as CRAG chapters were Government property and
invoicing/billing procedures.
b. Analysis:
After five years of experience since the
implementation of the CRAG, one-would think that additional
risk areas would be identified for inclusion in the program.
The lack of input to this question signals to the researcher
that contractors do not wish to see the program, as it
currently exists, expand. The prevailing attitude is that the
CRAG should not be expanded when there are problems with the
present program that have not been adequately addressed. If
the CRAG program is allowed to mature through constructive
change, contractors may be more receptive to offering their
ideas for expansion.
14. Question #13, Modification or Cancellation of CRAG:
Does your company feel that the CRAG program in its
present form is serving its purpose or do you feel the program
should be modified or even canceled and replaced by another
program?
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a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 14 represents responses to question 13.
No Answer 17 (2707) -Sotisfoctory As Is 18 (28.67)
Modify 9 (14.37)
Cancel/Replace 19 (30.2%)
Figure 14: Opinions Regarding Modification Or
Cancellation Of CRAG Program
b. Analysis:
Sixty percent of the respondents who answered this
question would like to see a change in the program. Their
comments will be incorporated with question 14. Forty percent
of the respondents indicated that the program was satisfactory
as is. Of this 40%, a majority of them were in the early
stages of implementation.
This may indicate that, as companies become nore
experienced with the CRAG program, they discover perceived
deficiencies that are counter to the expectations they had
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when they entered the program and, as a result, desire to make
modifications to the program.
15. Question #14, Recommendations For CRAG Alternatives:
If you checked modify or cancel/replace in question
13, what recommendations would your company make for a program
that would maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Department of Defense cversight responsibility?
a. Contractor Comments:
Comments from contractors with regard to reasons
for modifying or changing the program include that the concept
of mutual trust has not been fully achieved through the
implementation of CRAG. Also, some contractors feel that
there is no reduction in oversight, that they receive no quid
pro quo for their efforts. Another input received was that
the CRAG or a replacement program needed to better address
system analysis and process improvement rather than continuous
concentration on individual transactions.
Recommendations from the contractors for modifying
or replacing the CRAG program included building in more
teaming between industry and Government, adding more
incentives to the program for both the contractor and the
Government auditors, allow the CRAG to evolve further into
Coordinated Audit Planning and complete cancellation of the
CRAG program and replacement by DCMC's new program, Process
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Oriented Contract Administration Service (PROCAS). The PROCAS
program does not limit contractors to certain risk areas, as
does CRAG, and it promotes a team approach to contracting
administration between the Government and the contractor.
b. Analysis:
From the responses received to questions 13 and 14,
it is apparent that a certain amount of adversarial
relationship exists between the contractors and Government
personnel. The contractors seem to promote more of a team
effort in the formulation of audit functions whereby there is
not an "us vs. them" atmosphere. At the same time, they want
to ensure that whatever program is in place remains open for
continuous improvement.
A speculation made by the researcher due to the
literature review and preliminary inquiries into the topic was
confirmed by the contractors that they feel the CRAG program
has stagnated because it has not matured with the current
acquisition environment. The current acquisition environment,
together with the overall business environment, stresses
continuous improvement, while the CRAG does not address
continued changes in the purchasing processes.
C. SUMMARY
The companies involved in 1bhis questionnaire and those
individuals who were interviewed by the researcher displayed
a wide variety of opinions about the CRAG program and its
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implementation. While no particular individual or contractor
has a comprehensive view of the CRAG program, insight has been
gained by the researcher about their feelings regarding
elements of it.
A handful of issues continued to surface throughout this
part of the research. These issues include a quest for a quid
pro quo for participation in CRAG rather than empty promises
of reduced oversight, the perception that additional training
was required of the Government personnel involved in
oversight, a desire for greater participation from the ACO and
the need for a program that not only is monitored by all
parties but also is allowed to mature with a changing
acquisition environment.
A final point that was emphasized by most participating
respondents that supports the value of the CRAG program is
that because of it, channels of communication have been
established where none had previously existed. As one
contractor put it, they (all parties) no longer sit across the
table, they sit at the table.
From the contractors' viewpoint, the CRAG program has
acted as a catalyst in reducing the adversarial relationship
between Government and industry by instituting more trust and
cooperation between the parties. The focus of this study will
now be directed toward the opinions of Government personnel
about the CRAG program and its perceived benefits and
deficiencies.
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IV. GOVERNMENT OPINIONS AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
The Government began to implement the CRAG in November,
1988. The information contained in the Overview of the
previous chapter applies here as well. In addition to the
events mentioned in that chapter, DCAA held initial training
of all auditors soon after initiation of the program. DCMC
(formerly DCAS) personnel were also given introductory
briefings. Follow-up training then ensued only on an as-
needed basis.
Many efforts were undertaken during the initial years to
promote the CRAG program to the defense industry. Even with
the heavy promotion of the program, the defense industry was
slow to embrace it and they approached it with caution. In
May, 1990, Major General C. R. Henry, USA, Commander, DCMC,
outlined to industry the CRAG program and plans for program
implementation. In August, 1990, John Betti, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, sent a letter to the
executives of major defense firms to encourage their support
of and participation in the program [Ref. 41:p. 74]. The DCMC
field activities also held conferences and sent correspondence
to contractors in their areas, encouraging participation.
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Industry participation and Government efforts to promote
the CRAG are continuously being reported to the President and
the Congress through the annual report of the Secretary of
Defense, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports to Congress
and testimony to Congressional committees. One GAO report
stated that DoD claimed direct Government audit time was
reduced by 20,000 and 40,000 hours, respectively, for 1989 and
1990 as a direct result of the CRAG [Ref. 34:p. 10].
In an effort to determine the opinions of Government
personnel about the CRAG program, including its benefits, its
problems and modification/cancellation recommendations, a
questionnaire was sent to 120 ACOs of the DCMC field
activities. The reason the ACOs were solicited for input is
that they represent the single-face to industry for the
Government. The questionnaire is included as Appendix D.
Of the 120 questionnaires mailed, 66 were returned,
representing a 55% return rate. Additionally, personal and
phone interviews were held with reprcsentatives of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, DCAA and DCMC. The results are
included herewith.
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B. SURVEY QUESTIONS 4
1. Question #2, Familiarity With CRAG:
Are you familiar with the CRAG program and its
benefits?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 15 represents responses to question 2.
Not Frnmiior 8 (12. %)-
- /
'LFamiIar 58 (87.9•)
Figure 15: Government Personnel Familiarity With CRAG
b. Analysis:
Because the CRAG is a DoD wide program and because
of the wide promotion that the program received in its initial
years of implementation, the researcher felt confident that
4Question #1 requested the name of the command/activity, name
of the person completing the questionnaire and other data that are
not included in this thesis.
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most, if not all, ACOs would be familiar with the program.
With an 88% rate of familiarity, it is apparent that the CRAG
is known throughout most of the DOD's ACO community, although
a 100% rate of familiarity probably could have been achieved
had there still been great emphasis on the program. While
this question did not address the level of emphasis, the
responses show that the CRAG program has been advertised to
most of the personnel who work for DCMC.
2. Question #3, Benefits of CRAG to Government:
What do you think are the top three benefits of the
CRAG program to the Government?
a. Government Personnel Comments:
The respondents commented that there is a reduction
in the amount of oversight required for contractors, that the
relationship with the contractor was improved and that the
Government benefitted through a better utilization of
resources including personnel, time and money by focusing
their efforts on other risk areas.
Also, the respondents indicated that they felt the
credibility of the DOD procurement system was improved. They
claimed that there was a shift from management by contract to
management by systems which improved the efficiency of their
efforts. Finally, they reported that they received more
efficient and accurate proposals from the contractors.
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b. Analysis
All responses received were positive in nature and
included no dissenting opinions about the benefits of the
program. It was expected that the ACOs would indicate a
perception of reduced oversight and better utilization of
Government resources and these expectations were supported by
the responses as ranking number one and two, respectively, as
the top benefits of the CRAG program to the Government. What
came as a surprise to the researcher was that 24 respondents
indicated that they perceived a shift from contract management
to system management as being beneficial to the Government.
These data may be indicative of the growth of Total Quality
Management within the DoD, whereby management is focused on
systems and processes rather than on individual contracts or
products, as has been the historical record.
Because of these results, it is the judgment of the
researcher that the CRAG can be considered beneficial to the
Government.
3. Question #4, Benefits of CRAG to Contractors:
What do you think are the top three benefits of the
CRAG program to the contractor?
a. Government Personnel Comments:
The respondents indicated that the contractors
benefit from the CRAG program by receiving less oversight in
those risk areas of the CRAG that they participate in, that
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the contractors also benefit through better utilization of
their resources as a result of less duplicative audit
requirements and improved internal control systems and that
they become more profitable because of the efficiencies that
result from CRAG participation. The comments of the
respondents also included that the contractors enjoyed a
better working relationship with Government personnel and that
the competitiveness and reputations of participating firms
were enhanced.
b. Analysis:
The results of this question were similar in nature
to those benefits accorded to the Government. Three areas
that were emphasized by the majority of the Government
respondents, in order of precedence, indicated that the
contractors had a better working relationship with the
Government, that participation in CRAG could lead to reduced
levels of oversight and that through participation the
contractor could better utilize his resources.
While these were the top three benefits to the
contractor according to Government representatives, it is
interesting to note that, while similar, they are not the same
top three benefits as seen by the contractors themselves.
Recall that the contractors concluded that the top three
benefits were better communications, better working
relationships, and improved internal control systems. It is
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the observation of the researcher that Government and
contractor personnel are approaching the CRAG with differing
expectations that need resolution.
4. Question #5, Type of Training Experienced:
What type of training have you had/do you have with
regard to the CRAG program?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 16 represents responses to question 5.
Other 14 (15.6=)•,• ..
-On The Job Troining 24 (26.7•)
No Training 0D (1 1, )
-Reading Of Instractions 42 (46 7!)
Figure 16: Type of Training Received
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b. Analysis:
The literature reiterated many times the emphasis
placed on the promotion of the CRAG by the Government during
its early stages of implementation and led the researcher to
believe that the training accorded the employees would be
commensurate with that promotion effort. However, the data
indicate that the majority of the training effort directed at
the ACOs was in the form of reading of instructions and
policies and secondary to that is on the job training through
experience. During the course of the research, a plan for
continual or annual training on the CRAG did not surface.
This may be indicative of a need to focus administrative
efforts on devising a better training program, which could
lead to increased participation in the program and a higher
representation of benefits derived from it.
5. Question #6, Adequacy of Training:
Do you consider that the training you have received to
date is sufficient for you to facilitate a contractor's
participation in the CRAG?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 17 represents responses to question 6.
b. Government Personnel Comments:
Respondents' comments included that they only had
a limited knowledge of the CRAG objectives and
responsibilities through the reading of instructions and that
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•" / -Su÷licient 16 (24.2-)
Insufficient 50 (75.8-)-
Figure 17: Adequacy of Training
they were not trained in the specifics of the program. Also,
many of them commented that the CRAG was more of DCAA
initiative and not a DCMC initiative. They further commented
that any training they received should include a perspective
on the program from DCAA because CRAG is geared more toward
their audit and oversight efforts.
c. Analysis:
Because of the researcher's understanding of how
budget cuts adversely impact the number of personnel available
to perform tasks and the strain placed on training programs,
the researcher presumed that training quality would not be
satisfactory. That presumption was not too far off.
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Of those personnel who responded to the
questionnaire, 75% felt that the training they received was
inadequate to facilitate a contractor's participation in the
program. In portraying the single-face to industry concept,
the ACO is the central point of contact for all contract
actions after award of the contract. The CRAG is a tool
available to the ACO in the administration of contracts, but,
if the ACO is insufficiently trained, the program may not be
utilized to its fullest potential.
6. Question #7, Promotion of the CRAG Program:
Does your command/activity actively promote
participation in the CRAG program by DOD contractors within
your area of responsibility?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 18 represents responses to question 7.
b. Government Personnel Comnments:
Respondents indicated that over the past several
years many attempts have been made to inform the defense
contractors of the CRAG program and its benefits. These
attempts have included direct discussions with individual
contractors, correspondence sent to all contractors within
their area of responsibility, general meetings with groups of
contractors and through presentations made to professional
organizations. They reported that most of the effort directed
at promoting the program was undertaken in 1989, 1990 and 1991
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No Ans*er 4 (6.1')7
Active 33 (50 0')
Not Active 29 (43.97)
Figure 18: Promotion of CRAG at Field Activities of DCMC
and that a mass promotion of the program has not occurred
since that time.
c. Analysis:
Again, the literature research supported active
promotion of the program in its earliest years. Efforts to
,oromote the CRAG seem to have peaked in the 1990 to 1991
timeframe. Because of other initiatives and the decline in
the defense resources and budgets, promotion of the CRAG seems
no longer to be an issue in the forefront. As a result,
participation in the CRAG has apparently reached a plateau.
Slow initial participation was experienced, followed by an
exponential growth in participation through 1991, which was
then followed by little to no growth to this point.
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There was no indication by DCMC representatives,
either through survey responses or phone interviews, that any
other formal promotion of the CRAG was being planned.
However, through trade association and contractor seminars and
meetings, DCMC personnel, along with DCAA personnel, continue
to advertise the CRAG.
7. Question #8, Adequacy of Qualification Descriptions:
Do you consider CRAG to be adequate in its description
of the qualifications necessary for contractor participation
in the program?
a. Graphical I :esentation of Responses:
Figure 19 represents responses to question 8.
No Answer 26 (39.47) - -Adequole 25 (379-;)
Inadequate 15 (22.73)
Figure 19: Opinion on Description of Qualifications to
Participate in CRAG
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b. Government Personnel Comwen ts:
Most of the personnel who answered this question
responded that the qualifications required of the contractor
to participate in the risk areas identified in the CRAG were
sufficient in that they stated what the contractor had to
achieve but did not dictate what system had to be used.
Those -,to responded negatively felt that the
qualifications required of contractors' systems were too
restricjive and allowed no flexibility. Some commented that
the qualifications were open to interpretation and therefore
could not be applied uniformly, thus creating an atmosphere of
confusion and doubt about who should and should not
participate.
c. Analysis:
While some variation in interpretation of program
requirements could be foreseen, the wide range of opinions
expressed about adequacy of descriptions is indicative of a
general confusion regarding the program that was mor,
pronounced than expected. Although not specifically addressed
in the survey responses, this confusion could possibly be a
direct result of the perceived lack of training addressed
previously. With proper training, the ACOs could have a
working knowledge of the CRAG and might better understand the
descriptions of the qualification requirements for
participation in the program.
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8. Question #9, Voluntary or Mandatory Participation:
The CRAG program is currently a voluntary program. Do
you feel, based on your experiences, that adherence to and
participation in the program should become more directed,
perhaps even a mandatory contract clause?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 20 represents responses to question 9.
No Answe, 1r 2 %),
Diected 3 (4. ) 5 -) -
Voluntary 47 (71 2-)
Figure 20: Should CRAG Remain Voluntary or Become
Directed
b. Government Personnel Coimnents:
Comments of the respondents indicated that they
felt making the program mandatory, rather than voluntary,
would only serve to add another level of bureaucracy and
regulation on an already inundated acquisition process. They
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responded that making the CRAG mandatory would further strain
the relationships between them and contractors and make those
relationships more adversarial.
c. Analysis:
It was and remains the judgment of the researcher
that maintaining the CRAG as a voluntary program would
encourage participation by those who truly want to foster
better working relations with the Government. The responses
indicate that requiring the DOD contractors to participate
would build inefficiencies into the acquisition process rather
than create efficiencies. To make CRAG participation a
contract clause would just add another line item to the
statement of work. To mandate a program like this may
restrain innovation by the contractors and the Government
because the CRAG becomes just another regulation and serves to
disincentivize the parties because they have to participate
rather than want to participate.
9. Question #10, Difficulty in Implementation:
What areas of the CRAG program cause the most
difficulty in implementation of the program for contractors
under your cognizance?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:













Figure 21: CRAG Chapters with Difficulty in
Implementation
b. Government Personnel Comments:
Few comments were received on this issue. The
majority of those answering the questionnaire did not answer
this question because of a lack of actual experience in
implementation of the program. Two comments were received by
respondents. One of those responses was that the areas of
Labor Charging and Estimating Systems were open to
interpretation. The other response reported that in the area
of MMAS there existed ten key objectives which, by regulation,
had to be proven and therefore implementation and testing of
procedures were hindered by that regulation.
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c. Analysis:
The researcher made no suppositions about the
outcome of this question other than that the Purchasing
Systems Chapter should not have had many implementation
difficulties.
The ACOs who did answer this question felt that
implementation of the Estimating Systems chapter was the most
difficult. This may be because of the rapidly changing
structure of the defense industry, which tends to play havoc
in the computation of overhead rates because of a declining
base which was alluded to in the previous Chapter. Because of
the difficulty in forecasting future events, contractor
estimates continue to be held to close scrutiny.
10. Question #11, Increased or Decreased Oversight:
For those contractors who have elected participation
in the CRAG program, as a whole, have they experienced an
increase or decrease in the amount or scope of oversight
exercised by Government representatives?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 22 represents responses to question 11.
b. Analysis:
Because of the nature and the bases on which the
CRAG program was developed, the researcher anticipated a
higher number of reports of reduced oversight activity
directed at program participants and no reports of increased
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-Decrease 6 (9 i1)
-increase 0 (0 0-)
No Change 17 (25.8 ,
No Answer 43 (6 5.2)-
Figure 22: Changes in Oversight As Result of CRAG
Participation
oversight.
Of the 23 respondents who answered this question,
74% reported no change in oversight levels and 26% reported a
decrease which was less than expected. The 74% who saw no
change in oversight levels did not address whether or not
there was a shift in oversight effort from CRAG areas to other
risk areas. Such a shift may be the cause for no change, but
it cannot be determined from the input received.
A more significant finding of the inputs, in
support of researcher expectations, revealed that there were
no instances of increased oversight, which may indicate that
the CRAG program has improved contractor internal control
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systems, thereby eliminating the need for continued or
additional levels of oversight.
11. Question *12, Specific Data on Contractor
Participation:
Can you relay any specific instances where oversight
has been reduced/increased as a result of participation of a
contractor in the CRAG?
a. Government Personnel Conments:
The respondents relayed that, as a direct result of
contractors' participation in CRAG, visits to contractors'
sites for surveys were significantly reduced, floor checks
were reduced in the area of Labor Charging, DCAA audit time
was reduced and, in the area of Purchasing, some ACOs reported
that CPSRs were achieved in five days rather than the normal
two weeks and waivers were granted for not conducting interim
CPSRs.
b. Analysis:
As shown by the inputs, reductions in oversight
activity can be achieved through CRAG participation. Amounts
and levels varied from contractor to contractor depending on
the risk areas covered and the adequacy of their control
systems. Surprisingly, the oversight reductions are not
concentrated in one particular risk area, but are spread
across the spectrum of the CRAG chapters. To the researcher,
this leads to an observation that no chapter of the CRAG is
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any easier or harder to undertake and that efforts to
participate in any chapter are resource equivalent. This
introduces the possibility that all participants could expand
participation without tremendous growth in resource demands.
12. Question #13, Modification or Cancellation of CRAG:
Do you feel that the CRAG program in its present form
is serving its purpose or do you feel that program should be
modified or even canceled and replaced by another program?
a. Graphical Presentation of Responses:
Figure 23 represents responses to question 13.
- -Satisfoclory As is 9 (13.6-)
No Answer 30 (45.5V ) "! ! -- &odif, I I 67•)
Cancel/Replace 16 (24.2%)
Figure 23: Should CRAG Be Modified or Canceled
b. Government Personnel Comments:
Many of the comments received from the respondents
with regard to the modification or cancellation of the CRAG
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program call for changing the concentration of the program
from simple monitoring of contractors' systems to a program
that concentrates on process improvement. The inputs
recommend adoption of PROCAS or some other joint initiative,
or assimilation of PROCAS practices into the CRAG program.
c. Analysis:
The same speculation made by the researcher in
Chapter III that the CRAG program has stagnated because it has
not matured with the current acquisition environment was also
supported by the Government employees. Of the 36 respondents
who answered this question, 75% saw a need for change to the
CRAG program through modification or cancellation and
replacement. This is indicative that the system has some
flaws and has not been modified to incorporate changes in
philosophy in the current acquisition environment.
To ensure that this is kept in perspective, it
needs to be pointed out that the lack of response by 45% of
the total respondents indicates that experience with the CRAG
program may be too limited for opinions to be formed as to the
need to modify the program.
C. ADDITIONAL DATA
Training of DCAA auditors is accomplished at their
facility on the campus of Memphis State University. Included
in this training are courses on all aspects of auditing, with
specific courses being taught for specializations. The CRAG
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initiative is incorporated into this training program.
Additionally, the DCAA policy and plans office holds quarterly
conferences that serve to sharpen skills and centralize
attention to critical areas of the auditing process. These
conferences are held nationwide for all DCAA auditors. On
more than one occasion during the past three years aspects of
the CRAG were the topics of the conferences.
Some of the actions undertaken by DCAA as a result of CRAG
participation include reducing staffing at some locations
through geographic reassignment and redirecting their efforts
toward other risk areas and audit of open overhead years at
contractor locations to clear up backlogs. In one case, DCAA
removed their office from the contractor's plant because the
company's internal control systems were functioning so well
that the staff of the office could be better utilized
elsewhere.
In response to a request for examples of positive CRAG
implementation, DCAA forwarded cases 5 which included the
following results:
"* Audit hours saved in area of labor were 800 and 2,000
respectively for fiscal years (FY) 1991 and 1992, mainly
attributed to floor checks.
"* Improved lines of communications, to include sharing of
audit plans.
5 Due to contractor confidentiality, the names of the companies
are not revealed.
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* Audit issues resolution procedures waere used to reduce
open overhead years from 8 years at the beginning of FY
1990 to 3 years at the end of FY 1991.
* Decreases in post award review audit hours and recommended
price adjustments. [Ref 42]
While these represent only a few of the success stories,
no instances could be found where the CRAG did not work to the
benefit of the Government.
D. SUMMARY
The opinions of Government personnel are as varied as
those presented by industry personnel. Again, while no one
individual or agency has a comprehensive outlook on the CRAG,
the researcher has gained an insight into the perceived
benefits and deficiencies in the system as seen by Government
personnel.
Certain issues continued to appear throughout the conduct
of the Government questionnaire and the personal and phone
interviews. Those issues include the amount of training
afforded the ACOs, the promotion efforts directed at expansion
of participation in the CRAG program and a perceived lack of
commitment in the reduction of oversight by the oversight
activity. Participation in the CRAG program does not
guarantee reduced oversight but can lead to it only by
Government determination.
As for the benefits of the CRAG program, the research has
revealed that Government employees and agencies are
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experiencing less adversarial relationships through closer
communication and coordination with their industry
counterparts. Additionally, resources are being utilized more
efficiently as they become available for other taskings
because of the success of contractor self-governance.
Now that the opinions of representatives of both the
defense industry and the DoD have been recorded and analyzed
with regard to the perceived benefits and deficiencies of the
CRAG, the conclusions and recommendations of the researcher
will be presented in Chapter V.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Implementation of the CRAG has resulted in reduced
oversight at some contractor facilities. As reported by both
contractors and DoD personnel, significant reductions have
been experienced at facilities of contractors who are
participants in the CRAG program. These reductions range from
a reduction in the amount and scope of audits to a reduction
or elimination of the number of Government auditors performing
oversight activities.
The incorporation of the CRAG policies in the
administration of DoD contracts has led to a less adversarial
atmosphere and improved working relationships between
Government and contractor employees. Both the Government and
defense industry personnel throughout the course of this study
have emphasized that participation in the CRAG has forced them
to communicate with each other on a more cooperative basis.
No longer do they plan activities related to oversight and
audits separately, they coordinate their efforts so that they
reduce any duplication of effort and share the results of
their work. Of course, the internal control systems accepted
by the Government remain the responsibility of the contractor,
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but the CRAG facilitates reaching agreement on mutual
expectations.
The CRAG is an effective program for furthering the
concept of self-governance as recommended by the Packard
Commission. One of the primary recommendations of the Packard
Commission was that contractors needed to be more active in
governing their actions and that the Government needed to rely
on those actions. Formulation of the CRAG fulfills that
recommendation and implementation at participating contractors
has proven its value. As stated in the earlier chapters of
this report, contractors and Government officials have
reported more reliable internal control systems since
beginning participation in the CRAG program.
Implementation of the CRAG has resulted in more efficient
utilization of resources for both the Government oversight
agencies and the participating contractors. Both the
Government agencies and the defense contractors have reported
that, because of the reliance they can place on the
contractors' internal control systems as a result of CRAG
participation, they can reassign personnel to accomplishing
other tasks. In the case of the Government agencies,
personnel can be shifted to other contractor facilities or
utilized to perform other audit functions such as clearing
open overhead years. In the case of the contractors, they
support this conclusion by reporting the reassignment of
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personnel from assisting auditors to performing productive
work output on current projects.
Perceived deficiencies exist in the CRAG program. Some
defense contractors feel that the CRAG is deficient in
offering a commensurate quid pro quo for the level of effort
that they exert on the CRAG program. They also report the
training of some Government personnel is deficient. The input
received from Government personnel supports this perception of
inadequate training with regard to the CRAG and its
implementation procedures.
And, finally, the CRAG program requires modification to
allow for up-front agreement on oversight tradeoffs and to
incorporate a CRAG review program to allow it to mature. The
survey results support the need to modify the program to get
agreement on a quid pro quo for successful participation in
the CRAG program. While the program, as it currently exists,
only offers to the contractor that reduced oversight will be
considered, it adds risk to his operations that tends to
disincentivize his actions. As procurement regulations change
and the business environment matures, so must the CRAG program
if it is to remain viable as an option for reduction of
Government oversight.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The first recommendation is that the Government and
defense continue to support this program. Both the Government
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and industry have benefitted from the implementation of the
CRAG program. Improved working relationships have evolved
because of this type of self-governance program in addition to
more efficient and effective oversight efforts. Although a
significant number of opinions were expressed to cancel the
program, a majority of the contractor (59%) and Government
(56%) personnel who responded to the question expressed a
satisfaction with the CRAG program as it exists or with some
modifications. To facilitate this continued support of the
CRAG program, four additional recommendations are offered for
consideration.
The four actions include emphasis and promotion of the
program; increased levels of training; initiation of a process
to monitor, maintain and modify the CRAG piogram given the
versatile atmosphere in which it operates; and building into
the CRAG program a quid pro quo for achievement and
maintenance of program qualification. In order to do these,
Government and industry must continue the cultural change of
creating mutual trust within the acquisition process. Without
an increasing level of trust and cooperation, any efforts to
forge the future may be futile.
Emphasis and promotion of the program is one alternative
that needs to be addressed. In researching the available
literature on the CRAG program, the researcher discovered that
very little has been published about the accomplishments of
the program. Most of the literature about CRAG and self-
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governance covers just the aspects of the program and its
implementation. The researcher found no published results of
contractor participation other than in GAO reports and in
records of Congressional subcommittee hearings.
The potential exists in the various trade journals for
Government and industry to advertise the savings and other
efficiencies that have been experienced since the start of the
program in 1988. While industry seminars and workshops are
held to advance the causes of self-governance and internal
controls, it may be overlooked that the audience is very
limited. Through the use of the trade journals a greater
audience can be reached.
Training is the second issue where improvements can be
made. More effort should be directed at training all
individuals, both Government and industry, involved in
contract administration through participation in the CRAG
program. Proactive training would increase the visibility of
the CRAG and would familiarize the participants with the
intricacies of the program such that they are empowered with
the knowledge to act. Such a training program should be
standardized so that all personnel get the same information
and should be scheduled periodically to ensure that current
developments and changes to the program are known.
Setting up a process to monitor, maintain and modify the
CRAG program as the defense acquisition environment changes
should also be accomplished. No program or business venture
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will flourish if it is not allowed to mature with its
environment. The CRAG program is five years old and has not,
to the researcher's knowledge, been reviewed for incorporation
of any changes. In addition, other programs have been
introduced such as In-Plant Quality Evaluation, PROCAS and
lesser known initiatives that may threaten the existence of
the CRAG program if the problems associated with the CRAG are
not addressed.
A final recommendation is to modify the CRAG program to
better incentivize contractors to participate in it. One of
the premises that CRAG is based- on is that oversight may be
reduced if contractors' internal control systems are
determined to be adequate. Their is no up front agreement or
any type of negotiation about oversight reduction as
consideration given for the contractors' efforts. While the
Government may be restricted by some laws and regulations,
they must be reviewed to see if they can be waived.
While implementation of these recommendations will not
resolve all the problems associated with low contractor
participation in the CRAG program and the associated
opportunity cost of oversight efforts that could have been
better utilized, they would be a step in the right direction.
C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To what extent has the CRAG program achieved its goals and
objectives and what modifications. if any, should be made to
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the program to increase its use and improve its benefits to
both Government and the defense industry? The CRAG program,
has proven, through implementation at participating
contractors' facilities, that it is of benefit to both
Government and industry. Although the benefits are there,
industry has been reluctant to embrace the CRAG program.
Additional information in response to this primary question is
addressed in the responses to the subsidiary questions.
What is the CRAG and what are its key objectives? The
CRAG is a joint DOD and industry program of self-governance
designed to improve contractors' internal control systems,
promote self-governance, improve the working relationship
between Government and industry and improve the overall
efficiency and effectiveness of Government oversight.
What areas of the CRAG do contractors choose/not choose to
participate in and what is their reaction to the program as a
whole? What are the views of contractors actively involved in
any aspect of the program and the views of those who are not
participants? There are no specific areas of the CRAG program
that contractors choose/not choose to participate in as a
whole. Individual companies have their own reasons for
choosing full or partial participation in the CRAG program.
They tailor their participation to their business involvement
with the DOD and whatever expectations and individual goals
they have.
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Opinions about the CRAG vary greatly. Some of the
contractors see benefits to the program while others don't.
Included in the list of negative concerns expressed by
industry about the CRAG program is the lack of a quid pro quo,
lack of involvement and commitment by some DCMC and DCAA
representatives and a general lack of training and
understanding about the program. On the positive side, most
contractors are of the opinion that working relationships have
improved as a result of the CRAG program because of greater
communication and cooperation.
What is the Government's position on implementation of the
CRAG program? The Government continues to promote the
concepts of self-governance through the implementation of
contractors' internal control systems. The CRAG program is
only one effort in this area and is supported by the DOD.
Initial efforts to promote the program resulted in some
participation by industry, however, there have been no recent
major efforts to promote further implementation of the
program.
The Government's position is that the CRAG program remains
a viable program of self-governance with proven benefits such
as reduced oversight of contractors, better utilization of
resources and improved working relationships with the defense
industry.
What have been the principal deficiencies in the CRAG as
noted by both Government and industry representatives and what
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actions can be taken to correct those deficiencies?
Insufficient training, lack of commitment to the program and
mutual mistrust have been identified by both Government and
industry representatives as deficiencies of the CRAG program.
Note that the deficiencies exist on the part of both groups.
Additionally, not permitting the program to mature was
discussed as a problem.
To resolve these deficiencies, training programs need to
be instituted that encourage the involvement of all concerned,
greater incentives need to be built into the program to
facilitate Government and industry commitment and, to counter
the mistrust, the mind-sets of all individuals involved need
refocusing. This can be achieved through advertisement of
shared benefits resulting from CRAG implementation. Finally,
a process to review the system for needed modifications
requires establishment.
What are the changes to be made to the CRAG to enhance its
effectiveness? Should the program be more directed or should
it be replaced by an alternative program? Should the goals be
altered through greater emphasis. deemphasized or completely
changed? The two major changes that were identified in the
course of the research that can be made to the CRAG program
include the inclusion of a quid pro quo at the initiation of
program implementation and the inclusion of other incentives
that would promote greater commitment by both Government and
industry. The CRAG program should remain a voluntary program
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to further enhance innovation and system reviews with the goal
of achieving greater efficiencies in the administration of the
risk areas and in Government oversight. While the goals of
the program are well stated, better salesmanship of attainment
of the goals experienced by those currently participating in
the CRAG would enhance its attractiveness to the defense
industry.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While this research effort gathered opinions from both
Government and industry on the CRAG program alone, the
researcher discovered that many different initiatives by many
Government agencies and many companies have resulted in a
state of confusion as to what program should be promoted. In
many respects, Government is not presenting a single-face to
industry. A recommendation for further research is to compare
the costs and benefits of the different self-governance
initiatives and try to determine the "best program."
A second recommendation for further research is to analyze
the CRAG program and establish a review policy or process to
ensure that the CRAG initiative matures with the acquisition
environment. Without change, the program will stagnate and
quite possibly cease to exist.
A third recommendation for further research is to repeat
this study within the next five years to ascertain if CRAG is
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still an effective tool in the reduction of Government
oversight.
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACO - Administrative Contracting Officer
CAS - Cost Accounting Standards
CODSIA - Council of Defense and Space Industry Association
COSO - Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission
CPSR - Contractor Purchasing System Review
CRAG - Contractor Risk Assessment Guide Program
DCAA - Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCAS - Defense Contract Administrative Service
DCMC - Defense Contract Management Command
DFARS - Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement
DII - Defense Industry Initiatives
DMR - Defense Management Report
DOD - Department of Defense
DODIG - Department of Defense -Inspector General
ES - Estimating Systems
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation
GAO - General Accounting Office
IDC - Indirect Cost Submissions
IG - Inspector General
LC - Labor Charging
MMAS - Material Management and Accounting System
PROCAS - Process Oriented Contract Administration Service
PUR - Purchasing
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APPENDIX B - EXCERPT FROM CRAG GUIDE
1. Indirect Cost Submissions
a. Control Objective:
Provide assurance that indirect cost claims, proposals and
billings applicable to U. S. Government contracts are
prepared and submitted in accordance with U. S. Government
laws and regulations.
b. Major Controls:
"* Preparation of Indirect Cost Submissions: Provide that
policies and procedures are established and maintained to
allocate allowable costs in billings, claims, or proposals
applicable to U. S. Government contracts in accordance
with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.2 and Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS).
"* Allowability of Selected Costs: Pr-vide that indirect
costs identified in FAR 31.205 are properly classified as
allowable or unallowable, including directly associated
costs, for U. S. Government contract costing, bulling and
pricing purposes.
"* Allocability of Indirect Costs: Provide that indirect
costs are properly allocated to cost objectives in
accordance with FAR and CAS as appropriate.
"* Contractor Compliance Reviews: Provide reasonable
assurance that the policies and procedures relating to
indirect cost claims, billings, and proposals applicable
to U. S. Government contracts are established, currently




Establish timekeeping and labor charging practices which
result in the accurate assignment of allowable and
allocable labor costs to U. S. Government contracts.
b. Major Controls:
"* Policies and Procedures: Provide adequate written
policies and procedures for instructing employees on the
proper charging of direct and indirect labor, and to
reasonably assure the accuracy of recorded time charges to
cost objectives.
"* Internal Controls: Provide for a system of internal
controls to include the maintenance of accurate labor cost
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data; the accumulation and recording of labor costs
allocable to cost objectives for the purpose of
determining proper cost reimbursement on Government
contracts; the verification of labor cost transfers; and
the segregation of responsibilities for labor related
activities.
"* Orientation and Training: Establish a labor charging
awareness program to train all employees, as appropriate,
on proper labor charging piactices.
"* Time Card Preparation: Assure that labor hours are
accurately recorded and that any corrections to
timekeeping records are documented including the
appropriate authorizations and approvals.
"* Allocation of Labor Costs to Cost Objectives: Reasonably
assure the proper allocation of labor costs to cost
objectives.
"* Validation of Undistributed Labor: Provide reasonable
assurance that labor transfers or adjustments of the labor
distribution are documented and approved.
"* Internal Reviews: Monitor the overall integrity of the
labor/timekeeping system.
3. Material Management And Accounting Systems
a. Control Objective:
Material management and accounting system must have
adequate internal accounting and administrative controls
to assure system and data integrity.
b. Major Controls:
"* System Description: Material management and accounting
systems must have adequate system description, including
policies, procedures and operating instructions compliant
with FAR and CAS criteria as interpreted by this control
objective and its major controls for all elements of
affected cost.
"* Bill of Materials and Master Production Schedule: MMAS
must provide assurance that the costs of purchased and
fabricated material charged or allocated to a contract are
based on valid time-phased requirements as impacted by
minimum/economic order quantity restrictions.
"* Operational Exceptions: The MMAS must provide a mechanism
to identify, report, and resolve system control weaknesses
and manual overrides. Systems should identify operational
exceptions such as excess/residual inventory as soon as
known.
"* Maintenance of Records and Audit Trails: The MMAS must
provide audit trails and maintain records necessary to
evaluate system logic and to verify through transaction
testing that the system is operating as desired. Both
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manual records and those in machine readable form will be
maintained for the prescribed retention period.
"* Reconciliation of Recorded and Physical Inventory: The
MMAS must establish and maintain adequate levels of record
accuracy, and include reconciliation of recorded inventory
quantities to physical inventory by part number on a
periodic basis. A 95 percent accuracy level is desirable.
"* Transfer of Parts: The MMAS must provide detailed
descriptions of circumstances which will result in manual
or system generated transfers of parts.
"* Costing of Material Transactions: The MMAS must maintain
a consistent, equitable, unbiased logic for costing of
material transactions. The contractor will maintain and
disclose a written policy describing the transfer
methodologies. The costing methodology may be standard or
actual cost, or any of the CAS 411.50(b) inventory costing
methods. Consistency must be maintained across all
contract and customer types, and from accounting period to
accounting period for initial charging and transfer
charging.
"* Allocations From Common Inventory: In a MMAS where
allocations from common inventory accounts are used, it
must have controls, in addition the requirements of (2)
and (7) above to ensure that reallocations and any credit
due are processed no less frequently than the routine
billing cycle; inventories retained for requirements which
are not under contract are not allocated to contracts; and
algorithms are maintained based on valid and current data.
"* Commingled Inventory: The MMAS must have adequate
controls to enure that physically commingled inventories
that may include materials charged or allocated to fixed
price, cost type, and commercial contracts do not
compromise requirements of any of the above major
controls.
"* Internal Compliance Audits: The MMAS must be subject to
periodic internal audits to ensure compliance with
established policies and procedures.
4. Estimating Systems:
a. Control Objective:
Provide a system for the development of cost estimates
that are current, accurate and complete through the use of
appropriate source data; the use of sound estimating
techniques and appropriate judgment; the maintenance of a
consistent approach; and the adherence to FAR 15-811,




"* Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities: Provide
for a written description of the organization, duties and
responsibilities of personnel who prepare, review and
approve cost estimates and the various functions that
contribute to the estimating process such as accounting,
planning, etc.
"* Cost Estimate Development: Provide that estimating source
data are applied appropriately and that the basis for
estimating elements are disclosed by providing written
guidelines for developing and supporting consistent and
verifiable proposals.
"* Compliance Reviews: Management to ensure that the
estimating system policies and procedures are up to date,
periodically reviewed and implemented.
5. Purchasing
a. Control Objective:
Ensure that adequate purchasing methods are used by
contractors for the acquisition of supplies and services
under the terms of their contracts with the DOD.
b. Major Controls:
"* Policies and Procedures: Provide adequate written
policies and procedures for guiding employees in the
implementation of efficient and cost-effective purchasing
practices.
"• Internal Controls: Develop and implement an adequate
system of internal controls.
"* Subcontract Clauses: Ensure that subcontracts contain all
flow down clauses required by the prime contract as well
as any clauses needed to carry out the requirements of the
prime contract.
"* Management of Purchasing: Organize and administer the
purchasing department in such a way as to ensure the
effective and efficient procurement of required materials
and parts at the most economical cost from
responsible/reliable sources including appropriate make-
or-buy decisions.
"* Purchase Requirements: Develop cost-effective and
efficient purchase requirements in order to achieve
adequate competition, the meeting of delivery schedules,
the ordering of economic order quantities, the control of
inventory and material and the expediting and follow-up of
purchases.
"* Selecting the Source: Select the most responsive and
responsible sources for providing required materials and
promotion of competitive sourcing in order to obtain the
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most reasonable prices from sources that meet contractor
quality requirements.
"* Pricing: Ensure that some form of price or cost analysis
will be performed in connection with every purchasing
action.
"* Subcontract Award and Administration: Ensure that proper
types of subcontracts are selected and that there are
appropriate controls including oversight and surveillance
of subcontracted effort.
"* Internal Audit Function: Monitor the overall integrity of
the Lurchasing system.
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APPENDIX C - CRAG QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDUSTRY




Amount of annual business with DOD:
Type of business/industry:
2. Are you familiar with the CRAG program and its benefits?
Yes El No 11
If yes, what do you think are the top three benefits of
the CRAG?
3. Has your company applied for participation in the CRAG
program in the past?
Yes El No El
A. If not, please explain why not.
B. If no, do you foresee the possibility of applying
for participation in the future?
Yes El No El
C. If yes, do you plan on requesting further
expansion or a reduction in your participation in the
program?
Expansion El Reduction [E N/A El
4. Does your company consider the CRAG to be adequate in its
description of the qualifications necessary to participate in
the program?
Yes El No El
Please explain.
5. Which of the five areas currently delineated in the CRAG
program does your company participate in? (Check as
appropriate.)
(1) Indirect Cost Submissions El
(2) Labor Charging El
(3) Material Management and Accounting Systems El
(4) Estimating Systems El
(5) Purchasing El
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6. Did your company experience any difficulties with
implementation of any portion of the CRAG program?
Yes El No El
If yes, explain the difficulty and how it was resolved.
7. Are there any areas of the CRAG program that your company
chose not to participate in? (Check as appropriate.)
(1) Indirect Cost Submissions El
(2) Labor Charging El
(3) Material Management and Accounting Systems El
(4) Estimating Systems El
(5) Purchasing El
Please explain.
8. Is your company experiencing any reduction in the amount
or level of Government oversight because of your
participation in the CRAG program?
Yes El No 11
Please explain nature and extent of reduction.
9. Is your company experiencing an increase in the amount or
level of Government oversight because of your participation in
the CRAG program?
Yes El No 11
Please explain nature and extent of increase.
10. What areas of the CRAG program cause you the most
difficulty in maintaining compliance with the procurement
regulations?
(1) Indirect Cost Submissions El
(2) Labor Charging El
(3' Material Management and Accounting Systems El
(4) Estimating Systems El
(5) Purchasing El
Please explain.
11. What recommendations does your company have that would
improve the CRAG program as it exists?
12. Are there any areas that your company would like to have
included in the CRAG program and why?
13. Does your company feel that the CRAG program in its
present form is serving its purpose or do you feel the program
should be modified or even canceled and replaced by another
program?
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Satisfactory as is El Modify El Cancel/Replace
El
Please explain.
14. If you checked Modify or Cancel/Replace in Question 13,
what recommendations would your company make for a program
that would maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Department of Defense oversight responsibility?
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APPENDIX D - CRAG QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GOVERNMENT





2. Are you familiar with the CRAG program and its benefits?
Yes 11 No EU
3. What do you think are the top three benefits of the CRAG
program to the Government?
4. What do you think art the top three benefits of the CRAG
program to the contractor?
5. What type of training have you had/do you have with regard
to the CRAG program?
a. On the job training LI
b. Formal classroom training U
c. Workshops or seminars El
d. Video presentations El
e. Reading of instructions/policies El
f. None El
g. Other (please describe)
6. Do you consider that the training you have received to
date is sufficient for you to facilitate a contractor's
participation in the CRAG?
Yes 11 No El
Why or why not?
7. Does your command/activity actively promote participation
in the CRAG program by DOD contractors within your area of
responsibility?
Yes El No El
A. If yes, how does your command/activity promote
participation.
B. If not, please explain why not.
C. If no, do you foresee future promotion of the CRAG
program?
Yes El No U1
107
8. Do you consider the CRAG to be adequate in its description
of the qualifications necessary for contractor participation
in the program?
Yes El No El
Please explain.
9. The CRAG program is currently a voluntary program. Do you
feel, based on your experiences, that adherence to and
participation in the program should become more directed,
perhaps even a mandatory contract clause?
Yes El No 0l
Please explain.
10. What areas of the CRAG program cause the most difficulty
in implementation of the program for contractors under your
cognizance?
(1) Indirect Cost Submissions El
(2) Labor Charging El
(3) Material Management and Accounting Systems El




11. For those contractors who have elected participation in
the CRAG program, as a whole, have they experienced an
increase or decrease in the amount or scope of oversight
exercised by Government representatives?
Decrease El Increase El No Real Change El
12. Can you relay any specific instances where oversight has
been reduced/increased as a result of participation of a
contractor in the CRAG?
13. Do you feel that the CRAG program in its present form is
serving its purpose or do you feel the program should be
modified or even canceled and replaced by another program?
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